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(79–81). The case for the causal closure of the physical does not succeed
either (109–113). The problem of evil is not conclusive (136ff).
Moreover, Menssen and Sullivan contend that revelation claims do
have good explanatory power with respect to the following facts (or what
they call CUE-facts): Humans have a special place in the universe (234ff);
consciousness has a function (242ff); humans have libertarian freedom
(245ff); human beings are equal and have inalienable rights (251ff). I cannot go into the details of these arguments but their discussions are in general of a high quality. I think the authors have made a very good case for
the possibility of a kind of non-standard natural theology, one that starts
with revelation claims in the very beginning.
In conclusion, it is useful to compare Menssen and Sullvan’s work to
Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation by William Abraham. Although
both books agree that we should begin with revelation claims in some
sense, the approaches are in fact quite different. Menssen and Sullivan
do not argue that we should begin with the acceptance of some revelation claims; nor do they make use of the idea of oculus contemplationis.
Their contention is that if we adopt the methodology of IBE, we can treat
the entire content of revelation claims as the hypothesis to illuminate the
data we have. While the starting point is different, the project is still a
kind of natural theology. As indicated by their book title, they look at revelation from a philosophical standpoint. In contrast, Abraham’s argument is
that natural theology is not necessary because revelation can stand on its
own feet. However, the two projects are not contradictory either. In fact
Abraham writes the foreword for Menssen and Sullivan’s book, and both
Menssen and Sullivan’s recommendations of Abraham’s book appear on
its back cover. In response to both books, I suggest that if revelation can
stand on its own feet, this does not mean that a supportive natural theology is impossible. In fact Menssen and Sullivan’s strategy of using IBE to
vindicate revelation claims can fit in Abraham’s complex rational appraisal of revelation. So both projects are in fact complementary, and together
they show that we do need to take robust revelation claims seriously in
both natural theology and revealed theology.

Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher, by Jacqueline
Mariña. Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 270. Cloth ($110.00).
ERIC REITAN, Oklahoma State University
Friedrich Schleiermacher is often called the “father” of modern theology. But in her excellent new book, Jacqueline Mariña introduces us to
Schleiermacher the philosopher, explicating Schleiermacher’s philosophical achievements in an intellectual history that traces the evolution of
Schleiermacher’s thinking, especially concerning the self and its ethical
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transformation, through his engagement with such figures as Kant, Spinoza, and Leibniz.
In so doing, Mariña has created a text that should be valued not only by
theologians interested in understanding the philosophical underpinnings
of Schleiermacher’s theology, but also by anyone interested in nineteenthcentury philosophy or the intersections of ethics and the philosophy of
religion. Mariña’s book is one of only a handful on Schleiermacher’s philosophy, and may be the most helpful in terms of identifying his distinctive philosophical ideas and how they ground his better-known theological innovations.
In the first chapter we encounter Schleiermacher’s youthful efforts to
wrestle with Kant over the questions of how the moral law can motivate
the will and, more significantly, how to resolve “the antinomy of agency”—that is, the problem of how agency is possible if it requires both that
an act “be explicable in terms of the agent’s character” and “that an agent
should be the initiator of an act if it is to be attributable to him or her” (39).
Schleiermacher’s efforts here are inconclusive and, as Mariña notes,
marred by philosophical mistakes. But they set the stage for what Mariña
portrays as a deeply fruitful and lifelong engagement with Kant. Indeed,
Mariña exposes Schleiermacher as a philosopher for whom Kant offers
both the foundation for further thinking and the critical foil against which
his own thinking develops. This may be the chief lesson of the first chapter, as it becomes a driving theme throughout the book.
In the next two chapters we encounter Schleiermacher’s youthful defense of Spinozism. In chapter 2, Mariña explicates his defense of the idea
that “there are no genuine individuals, and hence no real (noumenal)
agents” (43). In chapter 3 we witness him drawing out the implications
of this idea for personal identity. Insofar as Schleiermacher later rejected
Spinozism, what is most interesting here is, again, the deeply Kantian approach Schleiermacher adopts. For example, Mariña shows us how, in
criticizing the Leibnizian Jacobi, Schleiermacher proceeds “as if Jacobi
must agree with Kant’s critical idealism as Schleiermacher understands
it” (53), even though Jacobi explicitly endorsed a position at odds with it.
This internalization of Kantian themes persisted through Schleiermacher’s career, especially in terms of his appropriation of the distinction
between the phenomenal—the world as it appears through the activity of
the understanding (necessary for transforming the field of immediate experience into cognitively comprehensible objects of experience)—and the
noumenal, that is, reality as it is in itself. This distinction was especially
important for Schleiermacher’s understanding of subjectivity. He never
rejected the view, expressed in early defenses of Spinoza, that the noumenal self—which unites the field of experience and through its activity
makes of it a world of objects that can be cognitively grasped—remains in
its intrinsic nature incapable of being cognized.
At the same time, Schleiermacher was convinced even in his Spinozistic
phase that “the transcendental activity of the self” brings the soul “into
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contact with what is genuinely real” (75), even if the nature of this reality
cannot be cognized.
These ideas persisted and became instrumental in Schleiermacher’s
critical appropriation of Leibniz—the focus of chapter 4. It is here that we
first encounter the core notion of Schleiermacher’s theology, “the feeling
of absolute dependence,” which Mariña argues is at least partly an echo
of Leibniz’s idea of an immediate communication of the absolute to the
creature “in virtue of our continual dependence.”
But Schleiermacher rejected the insularity Leibniz attributed to the
monads, their inability to effect one another, partly because of his Kantian
commitment that “the self knows itself only in its relation to that which is
different from it and stands outside of it” (110). Self-knowledge depends on
the self’s receptivity to being effected by others, and so requires positing
such receptivity. More significantly, Schleiermacher saw the possibility of
genuine interaction among selves, and transformation on the basis of it, as
necessary for ethics.
Despite these differences, Leibniz’s understanding of the self as rooted
in the absolute offers Schleiermacher the key to understanding freedom.
His first step towards such understanding is Kantian: consciousness has
a transcendental unity “which is not itself determined by any sensation,
representation, or emotion” (129). That is, this unity is not determined by
anything connected to the empirical self.
But this merely establishes the possibility of a transcendent self not bound
by empirical causal laws. For an account of such a self, Schleiermacher turns
to Leibniz’s view of a self rooted in an absolute that transcends the empirical world. As Mariña puts it, “because the soul is directly receptive to the
divine influence, it is not a mere turnspit, reacting mechanically to outside
influences. The transcendental light of consciousness that opens out into
the world is a light preserved in its being in and through spirit’s relation to
the infinite and absolute” (131). The true self—conceived as the common
root of both the active and receptive powers encountered in consciousness—is a kind of contact point with the divine.
Here, Mariña’s prose testifies to the beauty of Schleiermacher’s synthesis but leaves some critical questions unanswered. For example, how can
that which is absolutely dependent on God acquire genuine agency of its
own in relation to the empirical world, as opposed to being just a limited
extension of God’s agency? And how could Schleiermacher justify this interpretation of the self in light of his skepticism about the knowability of
the noumenal?
The latter question admits of an implicit answer in the subsequent development of Schleiermacher’s ethics in chapters 5 and 6. These chapters
are too rich to do justice here. What follows is an attempt to synthesize
some core themes.
Mariña argues that, for Schleiermacher, the possibility of genuine ethics
requires selves that are both free in relation to the empirical world (requiring a ground beyond that world) and subject to being transformed by
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other selves encountered in that world (requiring “embodiment” within
that world). For Schleiermacher, this possibility will be realized only if the
empirical is constituted by the free activity of a self in response to that
which is given to it by something other than itself, especially by other selves.
Real ethical activity is possible, for Schleiermacher, only on the assumption that the empirical world is jointly constituted by selves that have freedom in relation to that world by virtue of their rootedness in God, but a
freedom limited by a givenness that needs to be accommodated. And what
is given is precisely that which other selves contribute. But the self retains
significant freedom in terms of how it receives what is given. As such, how
it constitutes its world involves an exercise of freedom that exceeds what
we find in Kant.
Hence, Schleiermacher’s justification for embracing his view of the self
may be precisely this: it is a necessary postulate for ethics. If so, we have
another place in which Schleiermacher is Kant’s student.
In any event, while the self cannot be an object of direct knowledge for
itself, insofar as it expresses itself in the empirical world and so provides
some of the givenness of that world to which other selves must respond
in their own constituting activity, the self can discover itself in the world.
Part of what it discovers is its own unique perspective on the world. As
Mariña explicates it, the individuality of each self is a function of that
unique perspective, and as such is given by its contingent situatedness
in the empirical world. And selves can, through an exercise of imagination motivated by love, come to an approximate understanding of others’
individuality.
The goal of ethical life—the highest good—is a coordination of such
selves, each valuing and harmonizing itself with the individuality of all
other selves. In short, the end of ethics is loving community. And what
is loved is the individual qua individual. Here is a crucial point where,
according to Mariña, Schleiermacher corrected Kant. For Kant, the individual was to be valued only qua rational being. But, as Schleiermacher
notes, our rationality is the least individuating thing about us. It isn’t the
individual self that becomes the object of love for Kant, but rather the
rationality that this self shares with all rational beings. But it is individuals that constitute a loving community, and so these individuals need to
be valued as such. For Schleiermacher, such valuation calls for more than
what reason finds of value in the individual (the individual’s rationality).
And so real ethical relations must engage the desires.
The attainment of the highest good therefore requires a transformation
of selves at the level of their contingent desires. Such transformation is
possible because the self’s spontaneous activity plays a crucial role in the
constitution of its world—a world of which the empirical self, with its contingent desires, is a part. Hence, not only can I come to understand myself
through how I am reflected in my world (including in the activity of other
selves); I also have the capacity, in the light of what I discover, to transform
myself through my spontaneous activity.
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And unlike Kant, who saw no hope for achieving his summum bonum
in the empirical world, Schleiermacher perceives that world as providing
the setting in which selves can be transformed, so that contingent desires
are coordinated by both the universal laws of reason and the empathetic
valuation of individuality, thereby realizing the highest good of loving
community.
In fact, through his religious commitments Schleiermacher sees this
“ensoulment” of nature as not merely a possibility but an inevitable feature of the world’s history. The job of the ethicist is simply to describe this
process. In chapter 7, Mariña looks at Schleiermacher’s theological view of
Christ as the person whose perfected God-consciousness—constituted by
the complete passivity of his human desires so that the divine reality at His
root can express itself fully as universal love for humanity—transforms
the community formed around Him. Because Schleiermacher saw the empirical world as the setting in which selves could impact and transform
one another, he had the resources to articulate a Christology according to
which Christ could effect the historic attainment of the highest good. But
even apart from this theology, Mariña can use Schleiermacher’s discussion
of Christ’s transforming impact to highlight how, within Schleiermacher’s
thought, “contact with another person and incorporation into a community founded by such an individual can be the occasion for ethical transformation” (187).
In the final chapter, Mariña explores how Schleiermacher’s thought
bears on religious pluralism. Here, the chief lesson is that different religions have positive value insofar as they can promote the kind of selfconsciousness from which love springs.
Overall, this is an extraordinarily rich and provocative book deserving
careful study. Those who pursue such study will be rewarded with not only
a deeper understanding of Schleiermacher, but a deeper appreciation of philosophy’s potential to help us better understand ourselves and our world.

Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002–2008, by
Thomas Nagel. Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 171. $27.95 (cloth).
DANIEL N. ROBINSON, Oxford University
In an essay published in 2007 and titled, “A Time of Transition,” Jurgen
Habermas offered this surprising estimation: “Christianity, and nothing
else, is the ultimate foundation of liberty, conscience, human rights, and
democracy, the benchmarks of Western civilization. To this day, we have
no other options. . . . We continue to nourish ourselves from this source.
Everything else is postmodern chatter.”1 Such a judgment, rendered by
Jurgen Habermas, “A Time of Transition,” published in Italian by Feltrinelli (2007)
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